The Jump Blog

Francis ain’t one to hang out in the fighting position sucking on Charms and tossing dice to see who gets the Ham Slice MRE, so I’m not surprised he came out swinging over at his new happy home on the web.

Don’t get me started on Shinseki. Me and Treadhead had this debate already. I tend to agree with Francis that some commanders on the ground do not have the training or the mindset to carry this mission out in the most efficient manner possible.

I do not know who the area commander was in Fallujah prior to the Marines rolling in, but I do know that it was the 82nd on the ground there. Really the 82nd does not (or at least did not when I was there) train for this type of counter-insurgency operation.

We trained to jump in, seize a foothold (read airfield) and aggressively defend that foothold for follow on forces. Once follow on forces were in place they would assume the tasks needed to implement long term strategic goals. We were a quick reaction shock force that excelled at fighting for a piece of ground while surrounded and that’s what we trained to do.

That’s what our primary training area (JRTC) was all about: reacting to attack.

It goes like this: you jump in and sieze control of an airfield then set up a perimeter. You run patrols near your AO to make sure that no OPFOR are up to hanky panky. Once you’ve expanded your AO you hold it. If there is OPFOR activity outside your wire you engage it. If ther eare attacks near your wire you send out patrols. But the whole time your focus is on your AO and defending the piece of ground you have been assigned.

Remove the insertion method and that’s what the 82nd was doing in Falujah.

Marines train to attack, to move forward to aggressivley close with and kill any enemy in front of them and that’s it. Granted Marines and Airborne troops have the most in common between the two branches, and most Marines get along well with Airborne troops and vice versa, but it is still a different mind set.

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